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During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, >150,000 persons were quar-
antined, 24 of whom were later found to have laboratory-
confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Since
no evidence exists that SARS-CoV is infective before the
onset of symptoms and the quarantined persons were
exposed but not symptomatic, we thought the quarantine’s
effectiveness should be investigated. Using the Taiwan
quarantine data, we found that the onset-to-diagnosis time
of previously quarantined confirmed case-patients was sig-
nificantly shortened compared to that for those who had not
been quarantined. Thus, quarantine for SARS in Taiwan
screened potentially infective persons for swift diagnosis
and hospitalization after onset, thereby indirectly reducing
infections. Full-scale quarantine measures implemented on
April 28 led to a significant improvement in onset-to-diagno-
sis time of all SARS patients, regardless of previous quar-
antine status. We discuss the temporal effects of quarantine
measures and other interventions on detection and isolation
as well as the potential usefulness of quarantine in faster
identification of persons with SARS and in improving isola-
tion measures.
T
he severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidem-
ic from November 2002 to June 2003 came with much
public attention and left swiftly, resulting in >8,000 proba-
ble cases worldwide and 774 deaths (1). Prominent among
retrospective analyses is the belief that the simple ancient
system of placing persons suspected of being infected
under quarantine was instrumental in the quick contain-
ment of the outbreak (2–5). However, questions persist
regarding how quarantine worked to control this disease,
given the time-tested axiom that quarantine is most useful
only when patients are infectious before becoming symp-
tomatic, thus directly preventing secondary infections (6).
Moreover, due to early confusion resulting from imprecise
clinical diagnosis and case definition (7), correct clinical
diagnosis and prompt isolation were often impossible,
which resulted in insufficient isolation and gaps in the con-
tainment strategy for hospital infection control (8). Since
all available evidence indicates that SARS patients were
only infectious after symptom onset (9), one may argue
that quarantine provides a window of several days during
which illnesses can be diagnosed swiftly and persons iso-
lated accordingly. In this study, we used data from the
Taiwan SARS outbreak to explore whether quarantine was
effective in expediting the time from onset to clinical diag-
nosis and hospitalization, and the time from clinical diag-
nosis to classification as a probable case-patient, thus
contributing indirectly to prevention of possible infections.
Methods
Data
During the outbreak of 2003, 346 SARS cases were
officially confirmed in Taiwan, among which were 37
direct SARS deaths (cause of death was recorded as
SARS) and 36 SARS-related deaths (cause of death was
not directly attributed to SARS) as reported by the World
Health Organization (WHO) (1). To guard against the
potential threat of a large-scale epidemic, the government
attempted to place >150,000 people under home quaran-
tine. Two distinct levels of quarantine were implemented
in Taiwan. Level A quarantine, aimed at people having
close contact with a suspected SARS case-patient, was
implemented on March 18, 2003. Level B quarantine,
aimed at travelers from affected areas, was implemented
on April 28, in the aftermath of the first SARS death on
April 26 (10,11). Most of the quarantined persons were
confined to their homes for 10–14 days. Public health
nurses would bring the quarantined persons 3 meals every
day and sometimes helped them with odd jobs such as
washing clothes or taking care of pets. Center for Disease
Control–Taiwan officially confirmed 346 SARS-
CoV–positive cases, of which 17 case-patients had been
previously quarantined; 134 additional laboratory-con-
firmed antibody-positive SARS cases occurred, of which 7
case-patients had previously been quarantined. The total
number of confirmed SARS case-patients in Taiwan by the
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The 134 patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS
either had milder symptoms, and SARS was therefore clin-
ically diagnosed as suspected, ruled out at the time of the
outbreak, or considered probable in patients whose speci-
mens had previously tested negative by polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) or anti–SARS-CoV antibody, perhaps due
to wrong timing, but later were reconfirmed by >2 differ-
ent laboratory tests in a follow-up epidemiologic study.
Seven people in this group had been previously quaran-
tined. Our criterion for a quarantined person was someone
who had been placed under official quarantine for >1 day
before the onset of symptoms. Thus, persons in whom
symptoms developed on the same date or before the noti-
fication of quarantine were considered not quarantined and
were therefore excluded. Persons who were known to have
had a record of close contacts with others during the sup-
posed quarantine period were also excluded. One of the 24
case-patients actually had an imported case but was quar-
antined before implementation of level B quarantine on
April 28 for reasons other than simply being a traveler
from an affected area. 
Statistical Analyses
We compared the mean time from onset of symptoms to
clinical diagnosis (and admission) for the 24 patients with
laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV who had been quaran-
tined before symptom onset to that of the 451 SARS-
CoV–positive case-patients who had not. Note that 5 cases
were deleted from the data of 480 total cases for our com-
parison test because of missing information on their rele-
vant dates. (We will use the term “diagnosis” to mean
clinical diagnosis hereafter.) For the mean time from diag-
nosis to classification as probable case, we only used the
officially confirmed cases for comparison, since the labo-
ratory confirmed cases were either ruled out or classified
as suspected cases only and thus had no classification of
probable time. Again, 2 of these cases were deleted from
the data for our comparison test because of missing infor-
mation on their relevant dates; therefore, 344 case-patients
(17 quarantined and 327 nonquarantined) were used. Due
to the skewed data, we used the nonparametric Mann-
Whitney test. 
To investigate the effect of large-scale quarantine on the
changes in the efficiency of the public health system to
identify SARS patients for isolation, we considered the
temporal effect of important events for intervention and
control of SARS in Taiwan. On April 28, level B quaran-
tine was implemented, which marked the start of large-
scale home quarantine (12). 
A second important date in SARS prevention and con-
trol was May 10, when changes in the review and classifi-
cation procedures were implemented by the cabinet-level
SARS Prevention and Extrication Committee in Taiwan to
expedite the review and classification of SARS cases (13).
Before May 9, the relevant medical records (including any
available laboratory test results) of all reported SARS
patients were reviewed by a central SARS Advisory
Committee of the Center for Disease Control–Taiwan in
Taipei. Due to the rapid increase in the number of reported
cases caused by the hospital cluster outbreaks in Taipei in
late April, the SARS Advisory Committee in CDC-Taiwan
could not handle the rapidly increasing caseload.
Consequently, after May 10, 3 regional offices of the
Bureau of National Health Insurance in northern, central,
and southern Taiwan took over the responsibility of case
review. Local SARS expert committees were established
in the 3 regions with each committee consisting of special-
ists similar to the central committee in Taipei. The experi-
ences and the standard operation procedures of case review
and case classification used by the central committee were
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the Bureau of National Health Insurance through several
consensus meetings (14).
We used the Mann-Whitney test to compare the time
intervals from onset to clinical diagnosis of SARS symp-
toms of the patients with confirmed SARS-CoV with onset
occurring during the 3 periods of February 25–April 27
(period 1), April 28–May 9 (period 2), and May 10–June
15 (period 3). Five patients were deleted from the data for
our comparison test due to missing information on their
relevant dates, and 2 patients were deleted because their
onsets of SARS did not occur during the 3 time periods.
We also compared, using the Mann-Whitney test, the
intervals from diagnosis to classification as probable
SARS of the 343 officially confirmed SARS-CoV case-
patients (by dividing the cases into 3 groups, according to
the time period in which the date of diagnosis occurred).
Again, the laboratory-confirmed cases had never been
classified as probable cases. Moreover, 2 cases were
deleted from the data for our comparison test due to miss-
ing information on their relevant dates, and 1 case was
deleted because classification as a probable case-patient
did not occur during the 3 periods from February 25 to
June 15. 
Results
The mean time from onset to diagnosis for the previ-
ously quarantined persons (1.20 days) was significantly
shorter than that of those who were not quarantined (2.89
days) (Table 2). However, the respective mean times from
diagnosis to classification (6.21 days and 7.34 days) (Table
2), though slightly reduced for the quarantined persons,
were not significantly different. For the mean onset-to-
diagnosis time, period 1 was significantly longer (3.60
days to 2.49 days) than period 2 (p < 0.0001), while the
mean difference before and after May 10 was not signifi-
cant (p = 0.0722) (Table 3). The mean diagnosis-to-classi-
fication time (Table 4) was not significantly different from
period 1 to period 2. However, the time was significantly
shortened after May 10 (from period 2 to period 3). 
Discussion and Conclusions
The experience in the affected areas has shown that the
transmission of SARS can be prevented by adherence to
basic public health measures, including rapid case detec-
tion, isolation of patients with suspected and probable
cases, contact tracing, and good infection control (9). The
effect of possible delays in effective isolation of probable
case-patients has been studied in some modeling work on
SARS (15–17). In Taiwan, all patients were supposed to be
placed in the isolation room and negative pressure room, if
available, as soon as they were reported as having proba-
ble or suspected SARS. For most of May, the number of
suspected case-patients alone remained well above 1,000,
partly because of confusion in diagnosis and the tendency
to overdiagnosis because of heightened alertness on the
part of physicians and legal punishment for underreport-
ing. At times, however, due to the lack of available isola-
tion rooms or the number of suspected cases pending
review, patients with suspected but unconfirmed SARS
were kept for days in an observation room or emergency
department under crude isolation, where nosocomial infec-
tions readily occurred. At other times, patients scheduled
to transfer to another hospital with negative pressure isola-
tion rooms were temporarily kept in the observation room
in the emergency department where nosocomial infections
might occur because of insufficient isolation and protec-
tion procedures (18). When full isolation facilities were
not available to all patients, those classified as probable
SARS case-patients likely received higher priority and
were observed more closely during their isolation by
healthcare workers than were the suspected case-patients. 
For some case-patients, delays occurred because of the
patient’s uncertain status or urgent need for intubation
without comprehensive information on the patient’s con-
tact and clinical history; these delays led to insufficient
protection and isolation. One well-known case-patient was
the index patient at Hoping Hospital in Taipei, where the
largest cluster infection in Taiwan occurred. Her condition
was diagnosed and reported as suspected SARS on April 9.
However, because the patient had no apparent contact with
another known SARS case-patient, her case was reviewed
but not reclassified as probable until April 25, by which
time the clustered cases, which included medical staff
members and an x-ray technician who had contact with
her, had already forced the hospital to shut down on the
previous day. More strict infection control would have
been in place had the index patient been confirmed as a
probable SARS patient. Several other similar cases
occurred in Taiwan, some more than 1 month later.
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Our results show that quarantine reduced the time from
onset to diagnosis but did not significantly reduce the time
from diagnosis to classification. Thus, a previously quar-
antined person could expect his or her condition to be diag-
nosed and to be hospitalized more quickly once clinical
symptoms appeared. However, the same person would not
receive higher priority in the classification process to
determine candidates for effective isolation. Nevertheless,
in many hospitals with available isolation rooms, patients
with suspected cases were effectively isolated as soon as
chest radiographic evidence of infiltrates consistent with
pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome became
available. Moreover, in the latter stages of the epidemic
when a reliable laboratory test for SARS-CoV became
more available, many patients were isolated in negative
pressure chambers immediately if results of reverse tran-
scription–PCR for SARS-CoV from 2 different laborato-
ries were positive. Therefore, the effect of classification as
a probable case-patient might not be as pronounced as it
would have been otherwise.
For all laboratory confirmed case-patients, regardless
of whether they were quarantined previously, the imple-
mentation of full-scale intervention measures, including
level B quarantine on April 28, significantly decreased the
time from onset to diagnosis, but it only slightly improved
the time from diagnosis to classification. However, the
small sample size of 24 previously quarantined SARS
case-patients did not permit a meaningful test of whether a
significant difference existed for the previously quaran-
tined persons during each of the 3 periods.
By comparison, the change in the review and classifi-
cation procedure initiated on May 10 helped shorten the
diagnosis-to-classification time for all SARS patients,
indicating that the action by the SARS Prevention and
Extrication Committee to expedite the review process had
indeed worked. However, by separating the analyses of
data into discrete epochs marked by significant events, we
have included those cases whose illnesses straddle epochs. 
In the future, when facing newly emerging infectious
diseases like SARS, in which the patient’s infectivity in the
incubation period is unknown, precise clinical diagnosis
cannot be made, and modes of transmission are uncertain,
quarantine should be used not only to directly prevent pos-
sible asymptomatic infections but also to screen out poten-
tially infective persons and thus prevent secondary or even
tertiary infections. 
The quarantine in Taiwan was indeed useful in helping
to identify persons who are likely to develop symptoms
and isolate them more quickly if and when they did,
although its effect on isolation and infection control could
perhaps be improved by quicker classification or confir-
mation of previously quarantined patients. No conclusion
was drawn regarding whether better outbreak control
would be achieved by placing fewer persons in quarantine
or by concentrating on improving the efficiency of detec-
tion and isolation procedures. In fact, each area may be
improved in efficiency without jeopardizing the other’s
improvement.
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